

By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
No president in his right mind goes willingly into elections facing inflation, war casualties, recession, and hope for investment from his rivals and enemies – simultaneously.
I’m not talking about Donald Trump on November 3, the Congressional election day. This is about Vladimir Putin on September 20, the State Duma election day.
The risk to Putin is that, if ballot manipulation and fraud aren’t counted, the voter mandate for the Communist Party (KPRF) will be greater than for United Russia, the ruling party, by a ratio of about 35% to 30%; and that the number of Duma deputies representing the opposition parties altogether will reach a majority of the 450 seats. This would put United Russia in a minority for the first time, and Putin as weak as he was in 2000, when the Communist Party (KPRF) held 113 seats.
In the latest VTsIOM poll, for example, United Russia has dwindled to 30.6%, while the New People Party has reached 11% and continues to climb. VTsIOM always undercounts the Communist Party voters; they don’t confide in pollsters. On the other hand, in VTsIOM’s latest poll of trust in the top-five national politicians, Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov ranked fourth with 30%, trailing ex-President Dmitry Medvedev (37%), Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin (57%), and President Putin (77%).
Russian vote fraud is not so much if as how big – most experts estimate between 5% and 10% of the 114 million votes registered to be eligible. Ballot rigging of that magnitude has been well understood by Russian voters since Boris Yeltsin took power in 1991; it is expected still.
The warning signs in the public approval polls have been flashing since last September as the percentages have begun to grow out of the margin of statistical error. From last September to February, approval for the President has dropped from 87% to 82%; approval for Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin is down from 75% to 68%; approval of the Government, down from 74% to 67%; approval of region governors, down from 73% to 69%; approval of the State Duma, down from 62% to 58%.
In the election-winning, election-losing formula of Votes + Money + Bullets, these numbers are an urgent challenge for the Kremlin to recover the votes.
The accounting for bullets is this. On the Ukraine war front, direct sources report seeing concentrations for a “major offensive” of Russian infantry and tanks, with heavy artillery and air support, “on the Konstantinoka, Slavyansk, and Kramatorsk directions.” Another military source says this is the Russian response to last month’s Ukrainian counter-offensive in which territory was lost. “Russian forces are now attempting to take the [lost territory] back. I don’t see anything, however, that represents a major armoured thrust. There will be shaping attacks and the same kind of small-unit exploitation, then consolidation, we’ve seen before. I believe that if, or when, a major offensive comes, it will be a drive on Zaporozhye city and a move north to cut off, or threaten to cut off, the remaining Ukrainian formations in the Donbass.”
Success for the Russian operational strategy in all sectors of the front is dependent on methodically slow artillery, air, missile, and drone preparation; limitation of casualty risk by dispersion of men; concentration of numerical superiority by rapid manoeuvre plus deception. Since last September, the decline in the weekly Russian casualty rates — as measured by anti-Russian sources — has been a sharp one. Corroboration can be inferred from the daily Moscow briefings by the Ministry of Defense which are reporting a 10% to 15% drop in estimated Ukrainian casualties compared to December and January; this is a sign of fewer direct engagements and thus of corresponding Russian casualties.
In parallel with what sources believe to be Putin’s tight rein on ground operations at the front, the General Staff is expanding its missile and drone attacks deep into western Ukraine, aiming at the energy infrastructure between Kiev and Lvov; the railway links from Poland; and command bunkers for Ukrainian and NATO officers. To most Russian military observers this is attrition strategy unchanged, not a shift to a knock-out offensive. No source expects a victory parade by the autumn elections.
The election risk to Putin, therefore, is primarily economic. At his March 23 session with domestic policymakers, this is how he called it: “What stands out most is the weak, negative trend in key macroeconomic indicators.” Putin meant the 2.1% recession in the GDP measure in January. He didn’t say what the officials around the table understand but don’t say in public: this is the start of the two-year recession Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina has projected to run from minus 2.5% of GDP to minus 3.5%.
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