

By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
The survivors of the US attack and sinking of the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena on March 4 are direct witnesses of exactly what happened — not only in the hours and minutes before the attack, but also in the days preceding –at least a week — when Iranian officials were requesting sanctuary from the Sri Lankan and Indian governments; and also in the days following the attack – now almost a month ago — when Sri Lankan and Indian officials have prevented the witnesses from speaking in public.
The story of the plan of US attack and the evidence of the culpability of Sri Lankan and Indian officials was told here, and the Twitter stream which has followed.
This was not a report on whether the UN Charter, the international law on surprise attack, the rules of war and the Geneva Convention code of naval conduct were violated by the USS Charlotte in the submarine-launched torpedo firing without advance warning to its target; nor whether the Dena was armed or unarmed.
A US military assessment has concluded: “The sinking of the IRIS Dena was legal under the law of naval warfare, the submarine was neither required nor equipped to rescue the sailors it left in the water, and Congress had every opportunity to stop the war but voted against it. What remains harder to explain is why the U.S. left its premier submarine-hunting aircraft to fly drills alongside the Dena one week before a submarine killed her.”
Instead, the Dances with Bears report of March 24, and earlier ones, were presented to show Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Minister of External Relations, Subramanyan Jaishankar, had declared themselves on the side of the US and Israel against Iran before the latter launched their war on February 28. In their conduct of the negotiations with Iran over the Dena and its two escorts, before the attack and since then, the Indians have demonstrated they were not neutral.
Their attempts to retrieve this neutrality have followed after — but only because — the short war and defeat of Iran which they expected have failed; and after Iran’s fight-back put Indian workers, businessmen and offshore financial operations in the Gulf states at risk, and stopped essential supplies of oil, gas and fertilizer on which the Indian economy depends. No Indian mainstream or alternative medium has been found which has reported this evidence and discussed the implications of Modi’s abandonment of India’s neutrality.
There has been more public debate of Sri Lanka’s neutrality and criticism of the conduct of President Anura Dissanyake. In EurAsia Times, an Indian analyst Sumit Ahlawat reported on March 26 under the headline “Iranian Sailors Trapped in Sri Lanka: Tehran Demands Return, US Pressure Mounts — Can Colombo Stay Neutral?” He reports from an interview with Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath that currently, 252 Iranian sailors remain in Colombo’s “custody” – 15 on board the escort IRIS Bushehr, which was given safe harbour in Colombo, then Trincomalee, after the Dena’s sinking; the remaining 204 of the Bushehr crew at a Sri Lankan Navy camp, and in a separate Sri Lankan Air Force camp, the 32 survivors of the Dena.
There remain discrepancies in the official statements and press reports of how many Bushehr crew remain in Sri Lanka. Altogether, the Iranian total is either 251; 252; or 253, depending on source.
“They are not prisoners,” Foreign Minister Herath was quoted as saying. “But that doesn’t mean, give them all freedom.” The Iranians are being held incommunicado, allowed to telephone their families in Iran under strict supervision, but prevented from speaking to the Iranian media or the local press. In isolation from their fellow Iranian crew members, the special conditions of the Dena crew in Sri Lanka have not been reported.
Herath has admitted there is intense US government pressure not to allow the repatriation of the Iranian crews. The pressure includes the threat to reverse the trade tariff and other concessions which the Trump Administration gave Colombo last year after first penalizing the country’s exports with a prohibitive 44% tariff.
There has been sharp criticism from the Sri Lankan Navy of President Dissanayake’s calculated delay in allowing the Dena, the Bushehr, and the third vessel in the squadron, IRIS Lavan, to make safe harbour, despite their request before the Dena attack. “ ‘We did not take any prompt action,’ said former Sri Lankan Navy chief, Rear Admiral (ret) Sarath Weerasekara, in an interview with a London newspaper on March 16. “‘We could have saved those lives also. This has been discussed in the [Sri Lankan] Security Council and yet no action has been taken.’ In the aftermath of the attack, Sri Lanka agreed to allow Bushehr to dock late on 4 March, amid fears it too would be hit.”
There has been no investigation in India of the comparable delay by Modi’s National Security Council. Retired Indian admiral-rank officers have been critical in public of the US for attacking the Dena and for not assisting in the rescue of survivors; they are either unaware of the Modi decisions which exposed the Dena, or unwilling to express the dismay and criticism of Modi which are circulating in the Navy Headquarters staff in Delhi and at Eastern Command of the Indian Navy, which had hosted the Dena squadron at Visakhapatnam between February 15 and 25, before it set sail on its final voyage.
Because Russia is allied with Iran, providing both humanitarian and military assistance since the US and Israeli attack began, there have been official statements almost daily from Moscow on the targeting of Iranian civilians and the nuclear reactor complex at Bushehr, where Russian technicians continue to work, following their partial evacuation. Although the Russian Navy frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov participated with the Dena in the naval exercises at Visakhapatnam in mid-February, there has been no official Russian comment on the sinking of the Dena.
The most detailed Iranian comments have come in a 40-minute press conference in Colombo by Iran’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Alireza Delkhosh. He reveals that the first request for sanctuary for the Dena, Lavan and Bushehr was initiated by Iran before the vessels left Visakhapatnam on February 25. That is before the February 26 date which President Dissanayake has claimed in his press and parliamentary statements.
It also raises the question — did the Iranians also ask the Indian Government for safe harbour at the same time.
The Delkhosh disclosure means that the Iranian squadron set sail from the Indian port on February 25 without orders to return to the home port of Bandar Abbas. The Indian Port Clearance Certificate required to have been filed before February 25 must therefore show the planned voyage destination. This document remains secret. The subsequent course the Iranians took southward through the Bay of Bengal may have been extended eastward and slowed down because of the delays in Sri Lankan and Indian permissions.
That delay is the political crux of this story. Its outcome was the killing of the Dena and of the neutrality of the Indian and Sri Lankan politicians involved.
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