by John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
The defeat of the Russian army in war discredits, not the soldiers who fought and died, but the commander-in-chief and the generals who were in command. Defeat on the battlefield also destroys Russian military honour as a political force in the country, just as its opposite, victory on the battlefield, threatens the civilian commander-in-chief with his replacement by a soldier hero.
To protect himself from his triumphant, and also from his disgruntled officers, the commander-in-chief may make his generals scapegoats for the defeat. Joseph Stalin had begun shooting scapegoat officers before the German invasion of June 21, 1941, and then accelerated his purge in the weeks which followed. In 1946, in the aftermath of the Red Army’s victory over Germany, Stalin neutralized Marshal Georgiy Zhukov (for the second time), stripping him of his command powers and sending him into internal exile, all for purely political reasons. Stalin had allowed Zhukov to lead the victory parade in Red Square but only after Stalin had tried himself and failed to stay in the saddle of the white horse. Stalin’s jealousy of Zhukov’s domestic popularity was compounded by his (not unreasonable) fear of a military putsch and of the Caligula Cure.
For most Russians – and this has been a consistent finding of public opinion polling by the independent Levada Centre of Moscow – the President’s popularity, public trust, and approval of his performance run about 10 points ahead of the Russian trust in the Army. However, the two support each other on the upswing in the polls when there are victories to celebrate; and then on the downswing when there are defeats, rising casualties, and war fatigue across the countryside. Between 2022 and now, for example, Russian approval of Putin has risen to the 80% level; for the Army approval has also risen to about 70%.
It is the conclusion of the Kremlin and of the General Staff, therefore, that they should either hang together or if not, they will hang each other.
Having opposed but obeyed Putin’s orders forbidding them to fire on Israeli aircraft attacking Syria, or on Turkish ground operations in and around Idlib, Moscow sources believe the General Staff have now told Putin much more than the refrain, he’s heard many times before, “We told you so”. This time the General Staff assessment of the invasion of Syria, refusal of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to fight, and the replacement of the Assad regime in Damascus is that grave damage has been done to the protective alliances which Russia has been promoting in Africa, the Americas, China, and North Korea.
“We just have to accept that Iran and Russia have been comprehensively defeated in their non-fight, “a well-informed Moscow source says. “It is the worst defeat of Russia by the Turks in history. If Putin goes on now to make significant concessions in an Istanbul II negotiation with [President Donald] Trump, that will be the cherry on top of the Turkish halva. We are thinking this; no one is saying it. In the end, a defeat in Ukraine is all we care about. If Putin fails to deliver that, then he has a much bigger problem than the one he has just retreated from. Yes, this is a huge dishonour for us, but nothing is served by talking of it. Still, the situation can be redeemed in the Ukraine. This means the complete and comprehensive defeat of the enemy there.”
A non-Russian military source says the Russians he knows are “in denial. The Turks can now say we have them where we want them. This means the Israelis and the Americans can say the same. That means leverage above and beyond the Levant, in Africa, Asia and no less in Ukraine. What do the Russians have to offer their African or Asian friends now? Do they say — we’ll be there for you, of course, until the end – we mean your end. Of course, when the going gets tough, and potentially that means fighting the Americans or one of its proxy armies, the Russians now show they will blame their unwillingness to fight on their friends’ refusal to do what the Russians advise; their military incompetence; their corruption; or their racial inferiority compared to Russians.”
Russian military honour, as Russians understand it, is a code of uncorrupted selflessness and individual sacrifice in defence of the country. In national polling, this has been expressed by the consistently high approval of the Army. No other public institution, neither the presidency nor the Church, has drawn strength of support of this moral character.
Military performance on the battlefield counts, however. After rising sharply in the first year, 2022, of the Special Military Operation, trust in the Army began to decline in 2023 and 2024. According to a Levada report of six weeks ago, “confidence in the army remains quite high – 69%, but slowly decreases (by 8 percentage points since August 2022). The level of trust in the state security agencies and the police, on the contrary, gradually grows to 63% (an increase of 18 percentage points since August 2021) and to 48% (an increase of 19 percentage points since August 2021), respectively. The attitude to the prosecutor’s office and the courts remains unchanged – 43% and 31%, respectively.
RUSSIAN TRUST IN THE PRESIDENCY, THE ARMY IN NATIONAL POLLING 1994-2024
Click on source to enlarge -- https://www.levada.ru/
Levada polling also reveals that the brief rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner force in June 2023 drew considerable public support for what Prigozhin said in criticism of high government officials; but at the same time, there was considerable public opposition to what Prigozhin did in his armed revolt. For analysis of the Prigozhin affair, read this; and for the outcome in Prigozhin’s death, read more.
For the time being, the events in Syria have drawn no public criticism either of Putin’s performance or the Army’s by Prigozhniki – that’s to say, critics, not rebels. Instead, the Oprichniki, guardians of Putin’s reputation and public support, have imposed a comprehensive blackout of news, direct commentary, and published analysis of Kremlin policy in Syria and Russian military operations there.
The President has said nothing himself. At a Kremlin ceremony on December 9 to present awards for military valour, Putin said “we take pride in the courage of our soldiers fighting in the special military operation zone. Their resolve leaves no doubt that we will triumph, and that no-one will ever succeed in subjugating or overpowering Russia.” No medals for valour in Syria, no mention of Syria at all.
The Kremlin has deterred media discussion of Putin’s policy of allowing Israel to attack Syrian and Iranian targets at will; and his parallel policy of allowing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a free hand in Idlib, as well as along the Syrian frontier with Turkey.
Putin has already tried scapegoating: the commander of Russian forces in Syria, General Sergei Kisel (right), was removed on December 1. Intended for publication by the Russian military bloggers, the official line was that Kisel was incompetent. “The Syrian sandbox,” claimed Mikhail Zvinchuk, publisher of the Defense Ministry-linked Rybar blog, “ has long been a place for laundering the reputations of unsuccessful generals who turned out to be incompetent in the zone of the special military operation.” There has been no Russian to ask publicly how the Russian commander in Syria and the General Staff can act if the Kremlin has tied their hands. Instead, the Kremlin has encouraged media blame for Bashar al-Assad and his allies for their weakness. Among some Russian military analysts this also becomes the racist characterization of the Arab inferiority compared to Russian superiority.
Military sources in Moscow acknowledge that sooner or later there must be a Russian fight with the Turks, but not now. Instead, Kremlin and Foreign Ministry spokesmen are claiming that they are negotiating with the Turks for the security of the Tartus naval base and the Khmeimim airbase. Unasked, unanswered is the question – is it the Commander-in-chief’s decision to keep the bases and fight for them if necessary; or has he decided to evacuate under terms of safe passage guaranteed by Turkey, Israel, and the US?
In the four-hundred year history of the Russo-Turkish wars, there have been a handful of Russian defeats in battle; there is no record until now of a Russian retreat from battle without firing a shot. In World War I there was a tactical retreat by Russian forces from Trebizond in February of 1914, but the Turkish military gains were reversed over the next four years. The fight the Red Army then put up to defend the Russian Caucasus from the Turks between 1919 and 1921 is a historical reminder of the strategic purpose the General Staff have had in projecting Russian military force to the south of Turkey; that’s to say, Syria. The lessons of the reversal of that power projection, combined with the escalating war against Russia in Armenia and Georgia, have been brought to Putin’s attention.
In a report of December 10 by Vzglyad, the semi-official internet platform for security policy, sources were reported as claiming the Kremlin and General Staff had agreed on a partial withdrawal plan well in advance of the breakout of Idlib by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, Levant Liberation Council). “Russian representatives were probably negotiating to preserve the bases even before the militants in the north and the opposition in the south began their military operation.”
MAIN RUSSIAN MILITARY SITES IN SYRIA AS OF MAY 2022Click on source for enlarged view. https://israel-alma.org/
This plan, according to Vzglyad’s sources, withdrew Russian units deployed at Palmyra, Mambij and in the Kurdish territories in the northeast of Syria; redeploy them inside the Tartus and Khmeimim bases; and open negotiations with the new powers in Damascus. “Russia will have to strengthen its presence in Syria –” Vzglyad reported, “establish relations with different parties, monitor them, observe and negotiate…It is impossible to leave the bases – they are of great geopolitical importance and ensure Russia’s presence in Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.”
Vzglyad cites the well-known milblogger Alexander Kotz to point out that Russia’s bases in Syria are of strategic value. “To get to Africa, the Khmeimim air base has always been used as an intermediate point. If we are invited to leave, all agreements will be in jeopardy…Africa is now playing a crucial role for Russia. With the help of this region, we are ensuring the policy of a multipolar world and breaking through the isolation imposed by the West. Moreover, the loss of bases will affect our entire presence in the Mediterranean…If we leave Tartus, then hardly anyone in this region will ‘pour us a glass of fresh water.’ We will also have to minimize exercises in this area. At the same time, we should not trust the statements of the opposition which has come to power in Damascus. Thus, we face a long and difficult diplomatic path of negotiations with those representatives who have real political and military weight in the country now. We have specialists in such negotiations, because we conducted this process even when the active phase of the operation in Syria was underway until 2020. Of course, the situation has changed a lot now, but our diplomats have not gone anywhere.”
In Moscow, as the end of year celebrations get under way, sources claim to be in a “fighting mood. Our military leaders are earning the right to power, and there is nobody who doesn’t think that.” This is the sentiment among sources close to the General Staff and the Kremlin.
From Levada the most recent polling reveals brimming confidence in the future among Russians across the country. “Two-thirds of respondents (66%) feel confident in the future,” Levada reported on its survey conducted nationwide between November 21 and 27. “32% say the opposite. In the last two years, after the growth [of confidence in the direction of the country] in 2022, this indicator has not changed significantly. The sense of confidence in the future is more common among men (68%); young people up to 24 (79%); more affluent respondents (75% among those who can afford durable goods); residents of Moscow (76%); and those who approve of Putin’s performance as president (72%).”
Listen now to Chris Cook of Gorilla Radio lead today’s discussion of how Russia sees — and doesn’t see — the regime change and war in Syria.
Source: https://gradio.substack.com/
For the introduction to this broadcast, access to the 20-year Gorilla Radio archive, and Chris Cook’s blog, click here and here. For the lessons of how the US is fighting its war in Syria from the history of how the US has been fighting against the Arabs since 1943, read the book.
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